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ABSTRACT 
Organizational selection decisions often involve an exchange of information between 
candidates and decision makers as to why candidates are motivated to work in the given position. 
Drawing on popular management myths as our overarching framework, we theorize that 
candidates’ expressions of extrinsic motivation lead decision makers to infer that the candidate is 
less intrinsically motivated, in turn engendering bias against such candidates. We term this effect 
motivation purity bias, and argue that it emerges despite ample evidence, which we review, that 
penalizing expressed extrinsic motivation is not only unfair to candidates, but also 
counterproductive from the standpoint of maximizing future employee performance. Four 
studies, conducted among hiring managers and business school students, find support for our 
theory. We discuss implications for fairness and efficiency of organizational selection decisions, 
as well as for prospects of developing a more balanced view of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
in management research and practice. 
 
Keywords: Selection decisions; Motivation perception; Motivation purity bias, Intrinsic 
motivation, Extrinsic motivation. 
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MOTIVATION PURITY BIAS: EXPRESSION OF EXTRINSIC MOTIVAITON 
UNDERMINES IMPRESSIONS OF INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND ENGENDERS 
BIAS IN SELECTION DECISIONS 
 
 
On March 2017, Littlething.com featured the story of Taylor Barnes (Paules-Bronet, 
2017). Taylor, awaiting a second interview at a small start-up company, sent an email inquiring 
about salary and benefits. Taylor’s message read,  
“I had another question that I wanted to ask you. If I do end up filling this position, how 
much do you think I’ll be getting paid an hour? Benefits will also be included, right? 
Sorry, I just thought I should ask now.” Shortly after, the hiring manager responded, 
“Your questions reveal that your priorities are not in sync with those of the company. At 
this time we will not be following through with our meeting this Thursday… we seek out 
those who go out of their way to seek challenges and new opportunities. We believe in 
hard work and perseverance in pursuit of company goals as opposed to focusing on 
compensation. Our corporate culture may be unique in this way, but it is paramount that 
staff display intrinsic motivation and are proven as self-starters.”  
Luckily for Taylor, one of the co-founders of the company followed up personally with her, 
apologizing, and offering her a second interview. However, other job candidates may not be so 
fortunate if, as we argue, this incident reflects a widespread bias whereby decision makers view 
candidates who signal extrinsic motivation or interest in job features unrelated to the work itself 
(e.g., compensation or flexible schedule), as less intrinsically motivated, or interested in the work 
itself. We term this effect motivation purity bias, and argue that it causes systematic backlash 
against job candidates who express extrinsic motivation, a phenomenon that, we argue, is both 
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unfair to candidates as well as counterproductive from the standpoint of organizational 
performance maximization.   
We review early research portraying extrinsic and intrinsic motivation as antagonistic, 
conduced largely outside of work contexts (e.g. Deci, 1971; Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999) and 
focused on explaining “what people do in their free time” (Gerhart & Fang, 2015: 494), as well 
as more recent research, including organizational studies on the topic, which, in contrast, 
suggests that extrinsic motivation is not only important and instrumental in its own right, but also 
that 1) no form of extrinsic motivation is negatively associated with intrinsic motivation (Gerhart 
& Fang, 2015), and 2) salience of extrinsic incentives boosts the positive effect of intrinsic 
motivation (Cerasoli, Nicklin, & Ford, 2014). Our theory suggests that, despite this positive 
evidence, decision makers are biased against candidates who express extrinsic motivation due to 
a management myth aligned with early portrayals of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation as 
antagonistic. We explain both the emergence as well as persistence of this fallacy through the 
lens of psychological research showing that antagonistic construal of motivation is a natural 
tendency of the human mind (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee & Bastian, 2005; Miller & Nelson, 
2002). We argue that motivation purity bias will operate even in the context for which the 
current body of evidence most strongly suggests that expression of extrinsic interest should not 
be taken as a negative sign—selection for regular salaried employment (Cerasoli et al., 2014; 
Shaw & Gupta, 2015). We report four main studies testing this notion.  
Our research contributes to the literature on psychological drivers of biased selection 
decisions. The dominant theoretical paradigm in the literature focused on the biasing role of 
stereotypes (Dovidio & Gaerter, 2000; Lee, Pitesa, Thau, & Pillutla, 2014; Perry, Davis-Blake, & 
Kulik, 1994), or myths about social groups. For example, due to the historical gender role 
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divisions, people’s naïve belief of what it requires to be a good worker are biased in favor of men 
(Perry, Davis-Blake, & Kulik, 1994), despite evidence to the contrary (Hyde, 2005). The long 
history of portraying physically attractive people as more capable and sociable (Eagly et al, 
1991), despite evidence to the contrary (Feingold, 1992), engenders bias against unattractive 
people that is unfair and inefficient (Hammermesh, 2011). Attention to how myths concerning 
gender and beauty bias selection decisions developed into large programs of research, and, 
realizing the power of these social myths, efforts are being undertaken to correct them, for 
example, by changing media portrayals of women and physically less attractive people (Chira, 
2017; Pincus-Roth, 2017). We contribute to the literature through the first theoretical proposal 
and empirical demonstration of the importance of another widespread myth, one that is not tied 
to membership in a specific social group, but is related to a core aspect of selection (estimating 
motivation), and which also introduces bias in selection decisions. 
Our focus on biased views of motivation is relevant and novel because almost all research 
on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation focused on measuring how different external motivators 
influence workers’ intrinsic motivation and the relationship between intrinsic motivation and 
performance. Less is known about how decision makers think about workers’ motivation, despite 
the fact that extrinsic and intrinsic motivation are core concepts of business school education 
worldwide and thus that most managers do have naïve views of the phenomenon (Heath, 1999; 
DeVoe & Iyengar, 2004). Our juxtaposition of past findings suggesting that expression of 
extrinsic motivation should by and large be interpreted positively with our novel theorizing and 
empirical work showing that decision makers do the opposite suggests that issues caused by the 
science–practice gap go beyond those rooted in a lack of knowledge among practitioners, which 
most past work lamented (e.g., Rynes, Bartunek, & Daft, 2001). Our research shows that the 
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fundamentally self-correcting and evolving nature of science may create important science–
practice gaps whereby even outdated and contextually irrelevant science may take a life of its 
own among practitioners, producing unfair and inefficient outcomes, despite the availability of 
updated, better, and thus more useful scientific knowledge.  
Finally, we contribute to the literature on impression management and self-presentation 
strategies during the selection process. Our focus on selection decisions is informed not only by 
their key importance to candidates and organizations (Boudreau, Boswell, & Judge, 2001; 
Gatewood, Feild, & Barrick, 2008), but also by the fact that this is a situation in which 
discussing motivation is common and important for selection outcomes. The literature on 
effective impression management strategies during the selection process generally suggests that 
applicants aim to project a positive image of themselves, and that both applicants and recruiters 
share a common understanding of desirable candidate characteristics and thus self-presentation 
strategies (e.g. Bolino, Kacmar, Turnley & Gilstrap, 2008). In contrast, we suggest that decision 
makers’ bias against extrinsic motivation can lead to backlash unexpected by candidates, and in 
response to positively-intentioned and common candidate impression management strategies, 
such as the one in the example at the outset of the paper (see also “Pilot Study” for a richer 
account of common extrinsic motivation expressions). We return to the various practical 
implications of these insights in the General Discussion.   
THEORY  
Research on (Expressed) Extrinsic Motivation 
How does extrinsic motivation relate to intrinsic motivation? The question of how 
extrinsic motivation impacts intrinsic motivation has been the source of extensive research. The 
literature was sparked by an experiment conducted by Deci (1971), in which students were asked 
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to solve puzzles in a lab. Those assigned to the control condition were not paid throughout the 
three days of the experiment. Those assigned to the experimental group were not paid on the first 
and third day, but on the second day an unexpected payment per solved puzzle was introduced. 
The study found that, compared to the control group, the experimental group exerted more effort 
on day 2 (when paid) but less on day 3 (when not paid). This result was interpreted as showing 
that extrinsic incentives undermined intrinsic interest in solving puzzles, as evidenced by lower 
performance in the experimental group on day 3, after the payment was withdrawn.  
The result was interpreted as supporting the idea that making extrinsic incentives directly 
salient “crowded out” interest in otherwise intrinsically enjoyable tasks, a result that was core to 
Deci and Ryan’s Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET; Deci & Ryan, 1980). This theory proposed 
that pay for performance is detrimental to intrinsic motivation, and that it can enhance extrinsic 
motivation, which was assumed to be lower in quality and not as sustainable in the long run in 
terms of performance and well-being (Gerhart & Fang, 2015). Importantly, the key outcome 
examined in this line of research was whether people voluntarily engaged in certain tasks, as 
illustrated above. Thus, work-related behavior was not of interest in this paradigm; Gerhart and 
Fang (2015: 494) note that “behavior examined was what people did in their free time.” This is 
most clearly evident from the fact that what was interpreted in the Deci (1971) experiment was 
not the condition in which incentives were provided, and in which performance was the highest 
(with the positive effect of extrinsic incentives being twice as large as any other effect in the 
study), but the condition in which no incentives were provided, and the outcome was what 
people chose to do on their own. Thus, this research examined how introducing incentives, 
relative to not paying people at all, impacts behavior in free time.  
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Given the importance of motivation to work, this body of research gradually evolved 
conceptually and empirically to accommodate features of the organizational context (Gerhart & 
Fang, 2015). In the context of a relationship people engage in to earn money, talking about 
potential negative effects of providing them with money does not make sense. The discussion 
started focusing on comparing different types of incentive plans, for example contrasting directly 
salient incentives such as the per-piece rate payment schemes with indirectly salient incentives, 
such as those provided by salaried employment. Accordingly, the same researchers who 
pioneered the motivation crowding out effect, have updated their theorizing by developing Self 
Determination Theory (SDT, Ryan & Deci, 2000), which identified different types of extrinsic 
motivation, with the broad differentiation between autonomous (self-determined) and controlled 
(not self-determined) motivation. Forms of controlled motivation would include, for example, 
doing the job in order to satisfy another person’s desires (e.g., those of one’s parents’ or one’s 
boss; Ryan & Connell, 1989; Grant, Nurmohamed, Ashford, & Dekas, 2011). Forms of extrinsic 
motivation that focus on aligning work and other long-term personal goals are considered more 
autonomous. Referring to autonomous extrinsic motivation, Gagné & Deci (2005) noted: “When 
rewards are administered in an autonomy-supportive climate, they are less likely to undermine 
intrinsic motivation and, in some cases, can enhance intrinsic motivation” (p. 354).  
 Findings not only support this positive view of the role of extrinsic motivation, but 
clearly show that the downsides of extrinsic motivation tend to be confined to non-work settings 
initially studied in this literature. Specifically, research finds that even the least autonomous 
forms of extrinsic motivation (i.e., whereby work is not at all aligned with meaningful personal 
goals) exhibit generally positive albeit small correlations with intrinsic motivation (Gerhart & 
Fang, 2015). Importantly, more autonomous forms of extrinsic motivation, such as those where 
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work performance is also instrumental to other goals in life or career (which is at least to some 
extent objectively true of much of salaried employment) tend to exhibit medium to large positive 
correlations with intrinsic motivation, in the .64–.80 range (as reported by Gerhart & Fang, 
2015).  
These findings echo results from organizational research on the related constructs of 
“status striving” and “accomplishment striving” (e.g., Barrick et al, 2002). “Status striving” is 
conceptually similar to extrinsic motivation, focusing on interest in obtaining instrumental 
outcomes unrelated to the work itself. For example, typical status striving items would be “I 
frequently think about ways to advance and obtain better pay or working conditions” and “I feel 
a thrill when I think about getting a higher status position at work” (Barrick, Stewart, & 
Piotrowski, 2002: 9). “Accomplishment striving” is conceptually similar to intrinsic motivation, 
focusing on how motivated an employee is by the work itself. For example, typical 
accomplishment striving items would be “I get excited about the prospect of getting a lot of work 
done” and “I am challenged by a desire to get a lot accomplished” (Barrick et al, 2002: 9). This 
work also typically finds that the two forms of motivation are positively associated, again with a 
medium effect size of r = .50. Thus, ample evidence suggests that extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation are generally positively related.  
How does extrinsic motivation affect performance? The scientific discourse has been 
even simpler and clearer with regards to how extrinsic motivation affects employee performance. 
There is little disagreement that, on its own, extrinsic motivation has a positive direct effect on 
performance (Cerasoli et al., 2014; Shaw & Gupta, 2015). Most people have no choice but to 
earn for a living, and thus the ability of a job to satisfy material needs will clearly elicit 
motivation among workers (e.g. Wiley, 1997). Beyond immediate and essential extrinsic 
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personal needs, jobs also provide a way for people to develop their careers and provide for their 
families. As noted above, when extrinsic motivation focuses at least in part on such longer-term 
positive personal goals, it is considered to be less controlling and more autonomous, and 
desirable from the standpoint of healthy adjustment (Gagné & Deci 2005; Tremblay, Blanchard, 
Taylor, Pelletier, & Villeneuve, 2009). 
In addition to documenting a positive direct effect of extrinsic motivators, research also 
examined how the different extrinsic motivators moderate the relationship between intrinsic 
motivation and performance. This body of work finds that measured intrinsic motivation is a 
strong predictor of performance, and that making incentives salient, compared to providing no 
incentives, strengthens the positive effect of intrinsic motivation on performance (see Cerasoli et 
al., 2014, for a meta-analysis). Furthermore, the beneficial effect of salience of incentives on the 
effect of intrinsic motivation on performance is more pronounced (more beneficial) when 
incentives are indirectly salient (e.g., salaried employment). Directly salient incentives (e.g., pure 
pay-per-performance), compared to no incentives, still amplify the positive effect of intrinsic 
motivation on performance, but the positive moderating effect is somewhat smaller than that of 
indirectly-salient incentives, which we focus on in our research. Cerasoli et al. (2014: 980) note 
that “In a “crowding out” fashion, intrinsic motivation was less important to performance when 
incentives were directly tied to performance and was more important when incentives were 
indirectly tied to performance.” Thus, somewhat different from the original crowding out 
construct, which concerned the negative effect of extrinsic incentives on intrinsic motivation, the 
authors document that all types of incentives boost the positive effect of intrinsic motivation on 
performance, but the beneficial effect is stronger for indirectly-salient incentives (e.g., salaried 
employment) than for directly-salient incentives (e.g., per-piece rate payment).  
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In sum, both research studying extrinsic and intrinsic motivation by measuring extrinsic 
and intrinsic motives directly (Barrick et al, 2002; Gerhart & Fang, 2015) as well as research 
looking at the interplay of incentives (external motivators) and intrinsic motivation (Cerasoli et 
al., 2014), paint a picture of a synergistic effect of the two positive forces motivating people to 
work: Enjoyment of the work itself as well as the attainment of financial security and other 
important personal goals. Indeed, the general conclusion that when an employment relationship 
provides workers with a means to attain meaningful extrinsic life goals (financial security, family 
comfort, etc.), workers are more satisfied, motivated, and productive, resonates with conclusions 
reached in other organizational bodies of work, including research on needs (Kenrick et al., 
2010; Maslow, 1943), work–life balance (Beauregard & Henry, 2009), voluntary turnover 
(Mitchell et al, 2001), and psychological contract (Robinson & Rousseau, 1994).  
Myth on (Expressed) Extrinsic Motivation: Motivation Purity Bias 
We propose that, when it comes to decision makers’ responses to expressions of extrinsic 
motivation, the power of management research in shaping selection decisions is overshadowed 
by the power of what is perhaps one of the most widespread and prominent management myths, 
that extrinsic motivation is generally detrimental to intrinsic motivation. This myth may be 
rooted, as we elaborate, in a natural human tendency to view others in an oversimplified manner, 
in outdated “either–or” organizational theories, and in outdated management research regarding 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation specifically.   
First, the view of extrinsic motivation as antagonistic with intrinsic motivation can be 
understood against the backdrop of psychological research on how people perceive and 
understand others’ motivation (Haslam et al., 2005; Malle, Knobe, & Nelson, 2007; Miller & 
Nelson, 2002). This body of work finds that people in general hold an overly simplified view of 
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how other people’s minds work and thus underestimate the complexity of other people’s 
motives. For example, people realize that their own voting behavior may be motivated by a 
preference for one candidate as well as a dislike of the other candidate, but at the same time have 
difficulty imagining that other people would be guided by such complex motives, instead 
interpreting others’ voting behavior as reflecting clear preference for the selected candidate 
(Miller & Nelson, 2002). People also explain their own behavior by referring to more complex 
mental states, relative to how other people’s behavior is interpreted (Malle et al., 2007), and 
believe that other people actually have less complex mental states than they do (Haslam et al., 
2005). This general tendency to construe motivation in an overly simplistic manner might help 
explain both the emergence of the management myth portraying the relationship between 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation as antagonistic, as well as its persistence in face of 
management research finding the opposite.  
Second, the early organizational behavior literature was dominated by theories and 
narratives about human behavior and its management that depict human motivation as being 
“either-or” with regards to being driven by instrumental motives versus enjoyment of work. For 
example, McGregor’s (1960) Theory X and Theory Y, which is also a standard part of 
management education despite having been submitted to virtually no empirical testing, suggests 
that managers perceive employees as either motivated by the work itself (Theory Y) or oriented 
toward the material comfort that jobs provide, but not in the work itself (Theory X). In line with 
this tradition in motivation research, early studies on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation also 
tended to conceptualize and measure the two types of motivation as polar opposites. For 
example, an early measure (Harter, 1981) relied on a forced-choice format asking respondents to 
indicate whether they were intrinsically or extrinsically motivated. Thus, a taken-for-granted 
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assumption that a more extrinsic person would be lower on intrinsic motivation was prominent in 
early organizational behavior research. 
Finally, the myth that extrinsic motivation erodes intrinsic motivation specifically has 
been among of the most prominent in the management literature. Managers worldwide are 
influenced by various naïve theories concerning the psychology and behavior of workers 
(Denrell, 2003; Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005; Miller, 1999). Business school education is 
extremely prevalent in almost every country in the world and it is oftentimes a de facto 
requirement to gain access to managerial positions in organizations (Baruch & Pieperl, 2000). 
Core organization behavior courses typically involve a session on intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation. This topic is somewhat unique in the sense that, although it is central to management 
education, views on the topic have evolved tremendously (as reviewed above), and the popular 
discourse and even education have been slow to catch up with evolving research on the topic.  
As of yet, typical management education does not seem to have done enough to help 
correct this management myth. A superb (in our view) and perhaps the most widely used 
(including in our own courses) textbook on organizational behavior (Robbins & Judge, 2016: 
253) notes that “people who pursue goals for extrinsic reasons (money, status, or other benefits) 
are less likely to attain their goals and less happy even when they do.” The textbook discusses 
how extrinsic incentives can be structured to preserve rather than undermine intrinsic motivation, 
but does not mention research reviewed above suggesting that extrinsically motivated workers 
also tend to be much more intrinsically motivated (and neither do a dozen of other commonly 
used textbooks we perused). As such, the overall impression created by management education 
on motivation may be the one of a tension between extrinsic motivators and task enjoyment, 
which might easily be misinterpreted as meaning that candidates who express extrinsic 
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motivation are less intrinsically motivated. In fact, in a recent review Gerhart and Fang (2015: 
508) concluded that the “focus for so many years on extrinsic motivation as an almost 
exclusively negative” prevailed in the literature, education, and public discourse (see also Fang, 
Gerhart, & Ledford, 2013). As recently as 2009, a best-selling book repeating the idea of 
incompatibility between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation and suggesting this notion should 
guide organizational practices was being read worldwide (Pink, 2009).  
Given our review of natural tendencies to construe motivation in an either-or fashion, as 
well as the different popular myths reinforcing this interpretation, we theorize that managers will 
tend to infer that candidates who express higher extrinsic motivation are less intrinsically 
motivated. This is important because, similar to other biases, such managers’ beliefs guide their 
behavior and can thus have major implications for workers. Given the fundamental goal of 
selection decisions success to select candidates who will be good rather than bad performers 
when hired as employees (Hogan, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2010; Holtom, Mitchell, Lee, & Tidd, 
2006), the lower inferred intrinsic motivation (in response to expressed extrinsic motivation) 
should adversely affect selection outcomes. Intrinsic motivation is a strong positive predictor of 
performance (Cerasoli et al., 2014), and in this regard people’s naïve views are correct (DeVoe 
& Iyengar, 2004). Thus, to the extent that candidates who express extrinsic motivation are seen 
as less intrinsically motivated, they should be seen as lacking an important prerequisite for good 
future performance, which should in turn lead to bias against such candidates in selection 
decisions. 
We highlight the reason why we construe the described tendency as a bias. Recall that 
evidence conclusively suggests that extrinsic motivation not only boosts the positive effect of 
intrinsic motivation, but is also in its own right a strong independent positive predictor of 
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performance (Cerasoli et al., 2014). Thus, the inference that a candidate is extrinsically 
motivated should be interpreted as a positive sign of future performance of the candidate and 
thus candidate attractiveness to the organization. That decision makers display a bias against 
candidates who express extrinsic motivation during selection is thus contrary to the main goal of 
selection decisions (maximizing future employee performance), and at the same time unfair to 
candidates as it violates principles of meritocratic selection. Given this, we refer to the proposed 
effect as motivation purity bias. We predict as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: Expression of extrinsic motivation negatively affects perceived intrinsic 
motivation. 
Hypothesis 2: Expression of extrinsic motivation negatively affects selection outcomes by 
reducing perceived intrinsic motivation.  
We also examine, in an exploratory fashion, whether higher expressed intrinsic 
motivation negatively impacts perceived extrinsic motivation, rather than just the other way 
around. The tendency to construe different types of motivation as mutually exclusive might, to 
some extent, be an inherent feature of the human mind (Haslam et al., 2005; Malle et al., 2007; 
Miller & Nelson, 2002), and thus expression of any motivation might undermine perceived 
levels of any other types of motivation. Such symmetric effect would also be in line with Theory 
X and Theory Y, which broadly suggests that the different motivations are mutual exclusive. 
However, our theory also highlights that the public discourse was very asymmetric when it 
comes to discussing downsides of extrinsic motivation relative to intrinsic motivation. If this 
management myth indeed played a role in creating the motivation purity bias, it is likely that 
expression of extrinsic motivation undermines perceived intrinsic motivation more than 
expression of intrinsic motivation undermines perceived extrinsic motivation. Thus, testing 
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whether intrinsic and extrinsic expressions have symmetrical or asymmetrical consequences in 
impacting perception of the other motivation type sheds additional light on the sources of the 
problem as well as promising areas for intervention. 
OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH 
Across four studies, we test our theory by examining reactions to expressions of extrinsic 
interest in cover letters and interviews, which arguably represent common situations during the 
selection process in which candidates and decision makers exchange information regarding 
candidates’ motivation. In the interest of generalizability and relevance, we focus on the most 
common and financially relevant type of selection decisions, those for salaried employment 
(Gerhart & Bretz, 1994). In this type of employment relationship, presence of extrinsic 
incentives is held constant (i.e., incentives are salient for all candidates), and prospective 
incentives can be classified as indirectly salient (i.e., salary as opposed to per-piece-rate 
payment). As described earlier, indirectly-salient incentives that characterize regular salaried 
employment are the most synergistic with intrinsic motivation (Cerasoli et al., 2014), so focusing 
on this setting allows us to test whether the backlash against expressed operates in situations in 
which it is clearly counterproductive, and thus can be considered a bias.  
Our examination of expressed extrinsic motivation consists either of using quasi-
naturalistic materials, or of using realistic experimental stimuli whereby job candidates 
communicate that a certain extrinsic job feature (e.g., salary) would be satisfactory or cite 
extrinsic features of the job when describing why they are motivated for the job, based on our 
pretest, which found these forms of extrinsic motivation expressions to be common (see the 
following section for details). The types of extrinsic motivation expressions that we find to be 
most prevalent (and that we focus on in the studies) also tend to be those that past research 
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identified as most synergistic with intrinsic motivation, most notably expressions that one is 
motivated “because the activity is perceived as being instrumentally important for personal 
goals” (Gagné & Deci 2005: 335; see also Gerhart & Fang, 2015: 501). For example, candidates 
in our studies explain how benefits offered fit what they are personally looking for in life. Recall 
that such autonomous forms of extrinsic motivation that we focus on exhibit strong positive 
correlation with intrinsic motivation (Gerhart & Fang, 2015), in addition to their independent 
positive effects on performance. Finally, in all studies we examine whether the bias we predict 
occurs even for candidates who express higher levels of intrinsic motivation. Given the 
numerous benefits of intrinsic motivation we reviewed, the finding that motivation purity bias 
persists against candidates who express high intrinsic motivation would provide further 
demonstration of the problematic nature of the effect1.  
PILOT STUDY 
We first sought to empirically validate several key arguments underlying our theorizing. 
These arguments are: (1) Candidates do often inquire about or express satisfaction with extrinsic 
features of the job. (2) Expressing satisfaction with extrinsic features of the job or inquiring 
about them is done in a benign manner and is not associated with greed. (3) The myth about 
extrinsic motivation eroding intrinsic motivation is perpetuated, in part, by the management 
literature.  
 To validate arguments (1) and (2), we recruited employee samples online (n = 200, 
45.5% female, mean age = 34.37, s.d. = 10.29; mean years of work experience=14.42, s.d. = 
                                                 
 
1 Details of our studies (including elaboration on pilot studies, main study materials, data, code for analyses, and 
extended writeup, where applicable, for all pretests and main studies) are available on a dedicated Open Science 
Framework webpage https://osf.io/5248p/?view_only=091913ea17a14f20836193d01af2eb50. 
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10.73). We asked these employees to indicate how likely (1 = “extremely unlikely;” 7 = 
“extremely likely;”  = .85) they would be to express extrinsic motivation during an interview 
process (e.g. saying that they are “satisfied with the benefits being offered.”; “happy with the 
salary being offered.”; “appreciative of the perks that come with the job.”) The average response 
was close to “extremely likely” (mean = 5.58; s.d. = 1.01; significantly different from the 
midpoint of 4; t200 = 22.07, p <.001). On open-ended responses participants indicated that they 
would ask questions about salary, benefits, parental leave, flexibility to work from home etc. 
Dispositional greed was not significantly related to propensity to signal extrinsic motivation (r = 
-.11, p =.14), and neither was materialism (r = -.04, p =.56). However, trust propensity, an 
organizationally desirable trait (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007) was significantly and positively 
related to propensity to signal extrinsic motivation (r = .18, p =.012).  
To validate argument (3), regarding the inadvertent consequences of management 
education on naïve views of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, we recruited a random non-
overlapping sample of 294 individuals online (n = 294, 38.1% female, mean age = 35.7, s.d. = 
10.66; mean years of work experience=14.32, s.d. = 10.14) and we randomly assigned them to 
either read the page on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation from which the textbook excerpt above 
was taken (Robbins & Judge, 2016, 17th Edition: 253), a page on cognitive ability (Robbins & 
Judge, 2016, 17th Edition: 97), the second key predictor of performance (Robbins & Judge, 
2016; Maier, 1965), which allowed us to control for whether participants read about a major 
construct predicting performance, or not to read anything. We then asked our participants to 
mark the extent to which they agree with the following statements: “When a job candidate says 
he or she is interested in extrinsic features of the job (e.g. perks, benefits, salary) that would 
usually mean that the candidate is NOT as interested in the work itself.”, “If I were recruiting for 
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a job and a job candidate would express that he or she is motivated by extrinsic features of the 
job (e.g. perks, benefits, salary) it will make me think they are less motivated intrinsically (i.e. 
less interested in the work itself”, and “If Person A is highly motivated by extrinsic motivation 
and Person B is not, this means that Person B is more motivated by the job itself” (1 = 
“definitely true;” 5 = “definitely false;”  = .81). First, we found that, on average, people agreed 
with these statements (test against the scale midpoint: t293 = -2.70; p = .007; see the online 
supplement for details). Furthermore, we found that participants who read the page on intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation were more likely to agree than participants in either or both control 
groups (all ps < .001). These findings provide preliminary support for our overarching theoretical 
argument, as people self-report antagonistic views of expressed extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation. The findings also provide some support for our speculation that management 
education might have contributed to this biased view. 
STUDY 1: METHOD 
In Study 1, we recruited business school students close to graduation and most in the 
process of applying for jobs, and we asked them to write a cover letter for a specific job position. 
We had separate samples of coders rate cover letters for objective levels of either expressed 
extrinsic motivation or expressed intrinsic motivation, without making hiring decisions. We then 
had a separate sample of evaluators assume the role of a hiring manager, report their impressions 
of both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and make a hiring decision. This design allowed us to 
examine whether expressed extrinsic motivation negatively relates to impressions of intrinsic 
motivation, controlling for the actual levels of expressed intrinsic motivation (established by the 
coding), in that way isolating the theorized impact on decision makers’ perception.  
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To provide a rigorous test of our model, in this study we addressed several potential 
alternative reasons why expression of extrinsic motivation might be negatively related to 
selection decisions. For example, decision makers might interpret expressions of extrinsic 
motivation as an indication of greed, which may elicit concern that one may demand additional 
compensation in the future. Alternatively, decision makers might consider expressions of 
extrinsic motivation to be against a social norm suggesting that one should not discuss extrinsic 
motives (a norm that might have emerged due to the association with greed). Either of these 
perceptions may lead to a backlash against expressions of extrinsic motivation regardless of any 
effects on perceived intrinsic motivation. We deemed such alternative processes less relevant 
given the results of our pilot study mentioned earlier, which showed that candidates who express 
extrinsic motivation are in reality not more greedy or materialistic, and their expressions tend to 
focus on widely shared long-term life goals. Nevertheless, we examine whether the negative 
effect of perceived extrinsic motivation through diminished impressions of intrinsic motivation 
(motivation purity bias) persists after controlling for the direct effect of perceived extrinsic 
motivation, which accounts for all such additional reasons why a decision maker might respond 
negatively to (perceived) expressed extrinsic motivation, irrespective of any effect through 
perceived intrinsic motivation. We also measured directly these potential additional negative 
impressions (e.g. greed) to provide a richer examination of the phenomenon and also to be able 
to control for these impressions in our analyses.  
Candidate Perspective 
Participants. For the job candidate perspective, we recruited 256 business school 
students (44.43% female, mean age = 21.45, s.d. = 3.12) in exchange for course credit.  
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Procedure and materials.  Participants were told that they would take part in a hiring 
simulation. They were first asked to indicate in which field they were to apply for a job (e.g., 
marketing, finance, accounting, human resources, and general management). Once they made 
their choice they were directed to a fictitious ad (see appendix A on the OSF webpage), and the 
survey was designed such that the ad described a job of a consultant specialized in the field the 
participant indicated interest in. In addition to stating the key responsibilities and qualifications 
for the job, the ad also stated the range of salary and benefits offered. The ad was designed based 
on online ads for similar jobs available in the area in which the experiment was conducted (and 
in which most participants searched for a job). Participants were then asked to write a cover 
letter they would include as part of the application for the job, guided by several general 
questions aimed at helping participants determine how to structure their letter.  
Cover letters coding for objective levels of expressed extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. 
To obtain a proxy of the objective levels of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation expressed by the 
participants in the job candidate perspective, we recruited a separate sample of business school 
students (N = 496, 45.5% female, mean age = 21.27, s.d. = 2.92) in exchange for course credit. 
We provided the same definitions of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation used in this paper and 
participants rated each six randomly selected cover letters either for expressed level of intrinsic 
motivation or expressed level of extrinsic motivation (between-subjects) on a scale ranging from 
1 = “not at all” to 5 = “to a large extent.” We adapted measures of intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation from the Work Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation Scale (Tremblay et al., 2009). The 
items for intrinsic motivation were: “The candidate expressed that he/she is interested in the job 
because of the satisfaction he/she would experience from taking on interesting challenges”; “The 
candidate expressed that he/she is interested in the job because of the satisfaction he/she would 
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experience from being successful in a challenging and fun task”; “The candidate expressed that 
he/she is interested in the job because he/she derives much pleasure from learning new things” 
( = .89). The items for extrinsic motivation were: “The candidate expressed that he/she is 
interested in the job because of the income it provides”; “The candidate expressed that he/she is 
interested in the job because of the benefits it provides”; “The candidate expressed that he/she is 
interested in the job because it’s the kind of job that allows him/her to attain a certain lifestyle” 
( = .67). Participants were instructed to mark what the candidate expressed (rather than their 
perceptions of it). In addition, we asked participants in both conditions to rate to what extent they 
thought the candidate was qualified for the job (1 = “not at all;” 5 = “to a large extent”). For each 
cover letter, we averaged the ratings (justified based on a significant between-letter variation in 
both conditions, p < .001).  
Decision Maker Perspective 
Participants. We recruited 310 business school students, non-overlapping with other 
samples (45.75% female, mean age = 21.29, s.d. = 2.17) in exchange for course credit.  
 Procedure and materials. Participants were told they would be taking part in a hiring 
simulation and that they would be reading between three and four randomly selected cover letters 
written by job candidates, and would answer some questions regarding each candidate. They 
were presented with the same job description that was presented to participants in the candidate 
sample (only in a generic form, see details in Appendix A on the OSF webpage). 
Measures of perceived intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. After reading each cover letter, 
participants reported their impressions of both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation for each 
candidate, using the same measures as in the pretest (intrinsic motivation:  = .94; extrinsic 
motivation:  = .81). The only difference relative to the pretest coders’ perspective is that we 
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instructed participants to indicate what they think the motivation of the candidate who wrote the 
letter is, rather than rate objectively expressed motivation.  
Measures of alternative negative impressions. Participants completed two items 
measuring the perception that the candidate might have further demands from the company (e.g. 
“If hired, the candidate is likely to make large financial demands in the future”; = .92), three 
items measuring impressions of greed (e.g. “This candidate is a greedy person”;  = .92), and 
three items measuring the extent to which candidates’ expressed motivation is seen as violating 
norms of appropriate conduct in the given situation (e.g. “This candidate is acting in an 
appropriate manner for a work context;” reverse-scored to reflect norm deviation;  = .56).  
Selection decisions. Selection decisions may be categorical (“hire versus do not hire”) as 
well as in the form of continuous quantitative rating scores given to different candidates 
(ultimately factoring into hiring choices). To be thorough, we measured both in all our studies. 
We asked participants whether they would hire that candidate (“yes,” coded as 1, or “no,” coded 
as 0) and also gave a continuous score of the candidate ranging from 0 to 100.  
STUDY 1: RESULTS 
Table 1 contains details of Study 1 variables. The letters provide us with an insight into 
how expressions of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation naturally occur and relate to each other and 
other variables, so we comment on notable findings. First, we observe that coded intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation are positively related. Thus, it seems that those candidates who express 
higher extrinsic motivation also express higher intrinsic motivation. Higher expressed extrinsic 
motivation was unrelated to anticipated future demands and marginally negatively related to 
perceived norm deviation, which suggests that extrinsic motivation expression is indeed common 
and expected, as we argue. Yet, we observe a weak but significant correlation between extrinsic 
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motivation expression and perceived greed, and we also find that these negative inferences 
(perceptions of future demands, norm deviation, and greed) predictably adversely impact 
selection outcomes (see Table 2, in addition to Table 1), so we control for them in our analyses. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Analytical strategy. As each decision maker rated multiple candidates’ cover letters and 
each candidate’s cover letter was rated by multiple decision makers, we used the multi-way 
clustering algorithm developed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2006) to cluster standard 
errors by decision maker and by candidate. Table 2 contains details of Study 1 regression 
analyses. For this study and other studies in the paper we used logistic regression for binary and 
OLS regression for continuous outcomes.   
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Expression of extrinsic motivation is negatively related to perceived intrinsic 
motivation (Hypothesis 1). We regressed decision makers’ perception of candidates’ intrinsic 
motivation on coded levels of extrinsic motivation, controlling for coded competence ratings, as 
well as perceptions of future demands, norm deviation, and greed. We also controlled for number 
of words (count) in the cover letter, as the number of words may influence perceptions of how 
serious or conscientious the candidate is (Kruger, Wirtz, Van Boven, & Altermatt, 2004). Most 
importantly, we controlled for coded levels of intrinsic motivation, which allowed us to estimate 
whether higher expressed extrinsic motivation is associated with lower perceived intrinsic 
motivation regardless of the actual level of intrinsic motivation expressed. We found that coded 
levels of extrinsic motivation were negatively related to decision makers’ impressions of 
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candidates’ intrinsic motivation (b = -0.18, s.e. = 0.05, p = .001; Table 2). The results support 
Hypothesis 1. Results of this and all subsequent analyses in this study remain substantively 
unchanged regardless of whether control variables are included or not. 
We also find that the effect did not differ depending on the level of intrinsic motivation 
the candidate expressed (interaction: b = 0.09, s.e. = 0.06, p = .190), suggesting that motivation 
purity bias affected intrinsic motivation perceptions regardless of the level of intrinsic motivation 
the candidates expressed. Furthermore, we find that the effect is asymmetric relative to intrinsic 
motivation expressions: Coded levels of intrinsic motivation did not relate to extrinsic motivation 
perceptions (b = 0.06, s.e. = 0.07, p = .372). This suggests the effect may potentially be ascribed 
to management myths specific to extrinsic motivation.  
Implications for selection decisions (Hypothesis 2). Perceived intrinsic motivation 
predicted selection likelihood (b = 1.17, s.e. = 0.12, p < .001), while perceived extrinsic 
motivation did not (b < - 0.01, s.e. = 0.11, p = .967). The same was observed for the continuous 
measure of candidate’s rating, such that intrinsic motivation perception was related to higher 
ratings (b = 9.78, s.e. = 0.67, p < .001), while extrinsic motivation was not (b = 0.85, s.e. = 0.72, 
p = .240). These results are consistent with our arguments that decision makers perceive intrinsic 
motivation to be more important than extrinsic motivation when making selection decisions. 
We examined the indirect effect of coded extrinsic motivation on hiring decisions 
through perceptions of intrinsic motivation (controlling for alternative mediators), using a 
bootstrap method with 5000 bias-corrected samples (Shrout & Bolger, 2002; the same indirect 
effect estimation was used in all other studies). Extrinsic motivation had a negative indirect 
effect via reduced perceptions of intrinsic motivation on both binary selection decision (b= -
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0.21; s.e. = 0.06; CI95%: -0.33, -0.09) as well as the continuous candidate ratings (b= -1.73; s.e. = 
0.54; CI95%: -2.80, -0.68). The results thus support Hypothesis 2.   
STUDY 1: DISCUSSION 
Study 1 provided support for our predictions using a design high on realism, as students 
came up with their own cover letters, and we allowed expressions of intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation to vary naturally. However, this design is open to potential omitted third variable 
explanations, so, in Study 2, we manipulated expressions of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations 
using interviews scripts, and asked decision makers to evaluate four different job candidates and 
make selection decisions. This helped strengthen the internal validity of our conclusions.  
STUDY 2: METHOD 
Participants and design. We recruited 302 participants through an online crowdsourcing 
platform (47.7% female, mean age = 36.05, s.d. = 11.67, average years of work experience = 
16.34, s.d. = 11.06). They were each paid $1.5 to complete a 10-minute survey. Participants were 
randomly assigned to conditions of a 2 (expressed intrinsic motivation: average vs. high) × 2 
(expressed extrinsic motivation: average vs. high2) within-subjects design.  
Procedure and materials. Participants were told they would be taking part in a hiring 
simulation in which they are recruiting for a Project Finance Consultant job (see Appendix B in 
the online supplement). Participants were presented with a job ad that detailed job 
responsibilities and qualifications required, and the ad also specified the compensation package 
and benefits offered.  
                                                 
 
2 We compared average to high levels because we wanted to make expressions of the two types of motivation 
comparable to be able to meaningfully examine whether they have different consequences, and we thought that 
candidates are unlikely to express low levels of intrinsic motivation if they wanted to get the job they are applying 
for. We validated this assumption in a pretest described in detail in the online supplement. Thus, our approach was 
preferred from the standpoint of psychological realism and generalizability. 
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Manipulations of expressed extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. Participants were told 
they would be reading transcripts of interviews with four shortlisted candidates, all of whom had 
excellent recommendation letters from previous employers and passed situational judgment tests 
successfully. Participants were told that all four candidates have been interviewed by senior 
assistants and that these assistants transcribed parts of the interviews. The beginning of the 
interview included an introduction, after which the candidate was asked to list one strength and 
one area for potential development, while the last question asked specifically about motivation 
for the job and about what the company offers (see Appendix).  
Measures. After reading each script, participants responded to the same measures of 
intrinsic ( = .92) and extrinsic ( = .89) motivation, and selection decisions used in Study 1.  
Piloting of scripts. Since our theory suggests that perceived intrinsic motivation will be 
influenced by expressions of extrinsic motivation, as in Study 1, we assessed the effectiveness of 
our manipulation using a separate sample, with participants randomly assigned to conditions in a 
2 (evaluation of extrinsic vs. intrinsic motivation) × 2 (expressed extrinsic motivation in the 
script: high vs. average) × 2 (expressed intrinsic motivation in the script: high vs. average) 
between-subjects design. We recruited 376 participants through an online crowdsourcing 
platform (48.94% female, mean age = 36.56, s.d. = 10.89) and paid them $0.75. After reading 
one of the scripts, participants were asked, similar to the Study 1 coding procedure, about the 
extent to which the candidate expressed that they were interested in the job because of a specific 
motivation (either intrinsic,  = .84, or extrinsic,  = .63). We used the same scale as in the 
Study 1 coding, with an added item for extrinsic manipulation check: “The candidate expressed 
that he/she is interested in the job because it helps him/her achieve other objectives in life”. We 
added this item to provide stronger evidence of the validity of our manipulation, given that the 
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item clearly captures autonomous external motivation. To make the intrinsic motivation 
manipulation check equal in length, we added the following item to it: “The candidate expressed 
that he/she is interested in the job because he/she finds the work itself enjoyable”3.  
To check the effectiveness of the manipulation, we regressed coded level of expressed 
intrinsic motivation on expressed extrinsic and intrinsic conditions (high levels were coded as 1 
and average levels as 0 for each motivation) and their interaction. We found that, relative to 
average intrinsic motivation scripts, the high intrinsic motivation scripts were coded as higher on 
intrinsic motivation (b = 0.83, s.e. = 0.19, p < .001), while the high extrinsic motivation scripts 
were not coded as any higher on intrinsic motivation compared to the average extrinsic 
motivation scripts (b = - 0.30, s.e. = 0.19, p = .101). Importantly, the two factors were 
orthogonal, as indicated by the fact that there was no interaction between the extrinsic and 
intrinsic manipulations in predicting coded intrinsic motivation (b = 0.17, s.e. = 0.26, p = .524).  
We performed the same analysis with coded extrinsic motivation as the dependent 
variable and found that, relative to average extrinsic motivation scripts, scripts high on extrinsic 
motivation were coded as higher on extrinsic motivation compared to those average on extrinsic 
motivation (b = 0.45, s.e. = 0.17, p = .009), while those high on intrinsic motivation were not 
coded as higher on extrinsic motivation compared to the average intrinsic motivation (b = -.05, 
s.e. = 0.17, p = .731), and there was also no interaction between the extrinsic manipulations in 
predicting coded intrinsic motivation (b = 0.05, s.e. = 0.24, p = .843). Our manipulations are thus 
effective and orthogonal4.  
                                                 
 
3 We note that in Studies 3a and 3b reported below these items were used also in the main study. We also note that 
results of the manipulation check piloting stay the same if the added item is removed from each scale.  
4 The online supplement contains a table with the raw means of ratings in each cell.  
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STUDY 2: RESULTS 
Table 3 contains details of Study 2 variables, and Table 4 details of regression analyses. 
Since each decision maker rated four candidates, we clustered standard errors by decision maker. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Expression of extrinsic motivation is negatively related to perceived intrinsic 
motivation (Hypothesis 1). We regressed perceived intrinsic motivation on the two expressed 
motivation conditions, finding that extrinsic motivation was negatively related to intrinsic 
motivation perceptions (b = -0.29, s.e. = 0.04, p < .001; see Table 4). The results thus support 
Hypothesis 1. The effect stays the same without controlling for the intrinsic motivation 
condition, (b = -0.29, s.e. = 0.04, p < .001), and the same is true of all subsequent analyses in this 
study. 
We also find that the effect was somewhat stronger when expressed level of intrinsic 
motivation was high (b = -0.37, s.e. = 0.04, p < .001) than when it was average (b = -0.22, s.e. = 
0.07, p = .001; interaction: b = -0.15, s.e. = 0.07, p = .039). Additionally, in this study the effect 
was not specific to extrinsic motivation expression, as indicated by the fact that intrinsic 
motivation expression was also negatively related to perceived extrinsic motivation (b = -0.27, 
s.e. = 0.04, p < .001). This suggests that, in this study, the effect might have been driven 
primarily by a more general tendency to construe different types of motivation in an either-or 
fashion. 
Implications for selection decisions (Hypothesis 2). Perceived intrinsic motivation 
predicted selection likelihood (b = 1.58, s.e. = 0.13, p < .001). Perceived extrinsic motivation 
negatively predicted selection likelihood (b = - 0.72, s.e. = 0.12, p < .001), though the positive 
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effect of perceived intrinsic motivation on selection likelihood was significantly stronger (χ2 = 
36.96, p < .001). For the continuous measure of candidate’s ratings, intrinsic motivation 
perception was related to higher ratings (b = 14.26, s.e. = 0.67, p < .001), while extrinsic 
motivation was not (b = -0.04, s.e. = 0.74, p = .960). These results are consistent with our 
arguments that decision makers perceive intrinsic motivation to be more important than extrinsic 
motivation when making selection decisions.  
We examined the indirect effect of extrinsic motivation condition on hiring decisions 
through perceptions of intrinsic motivation. Extrinsic motivation had a negative indirect effect 
via reduced perceptions of intrinsic motivation on both binary selection decision (b= -0.47; s.e. = 
0.09; CI95%: -0.64, -0.32) as well as the continuous candidate ratings (b= - 4.26; s.e. = 0.73; 
CI95%: -5.74, -2.95). The results support Hypothesis 2. 
STUDY 2: DISCUSSION 
Study 2 provided additional support for our hypotheses using experimental manipulations 
of expressed intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and using a within-subjects design, thereby 
demonstrating that motivation purity bias obtains in situations in which decision makers need to 
choose between different candidates, as is the case in many hiring situations. Study 3a 
supplemented Studies 1 and 2 in four key ways. First, we wanted to assess selection decisions 
that are more consequential and thus more externally valid than the hypothetical decisions used 
in previous studies. Second, we recruited hiring managers who make hiring decisions on a 
regular basis to further increase the external validity and generalizability of our findings. Third, 
we enhanced mundane and psychological realism through the use of more elaborate and realistic 
materials, and also by having decision makers watch an interview with the candidate. Fourth, 
Study 3a used a between-subjects design, which prevented decision makers from comparing 
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candidates against each other. This was important as it afforded even greater experimental 
control, allowing us to keep constant the resume as well as the beginning of the interview, and to 
only vary expressed motivation in the interview, thereby allowing for a rigorous test of the 
hypotheses.  
STUDY 3a: METHOD  
Participants and design. We presented ourselves as a small professional services firm 
looking for help in validating our selection procedure and interview protocol. We recruited hiring 
managers through ROI-Rocket (previously ClearVoice), a U.S.-based market research 
organization, which helped us recruit managers with at least three direct reports who make hiring 
decisions on a regular basis. ROI-Rocket verifies its panelists’ employment status through a 
comprehensive verification procedure, and we reached an agreement with them that allowed us 
to use a cover story and thus collect data unobtrusively (approved by our IRB). Participants were 
told that our human resource team has interviewed and video-taped candidates and that we were 
seeking outside input from human resource professionals in evaluating these candidates with the 
aim of informing and making more objective our selection decisions. Thus, this was an 
unobtrusive data collection, as decision makers were made to believe they were being hired to 
provide input into how a hiring process of a real firm would be designed. 
The sample consisted of 239 participants (23.01% female, mean age = 45.07, s.d. = 
11.20). Participants had 21.39 years of work experience on average, and the sample was very 
diverse in terms of experience (s.d. = 11.40). This allowed us to test the possibility that that 
experienced decision‐makers are less naïve about the myth surrounding extrinsic motivation, and 
we report the results of exploratory tests examining this possibility. We also asked managers in 
the end of the study about their frequency of making hiring decisions: 72.8% reported making a 
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hiring decision at least once a month, 23% once in six months, and 4.2% once a year. We paid 
ROI-Rocket $12 for each recruited hiring manager. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
condition in a 2 (expressed extrinsic motivation: average vs. high) × 2 (expressed intrinsic 
motivation: average vs. high) between-subjects design. 
Procedure and materials. Participants were told that we have converged on four finalists 
who have passed the first two interviews and situational judgment tests, and that we were asking 
them to read a resume of one of these finalists, watch a videotaped interview with the finalist, 
and finally to report selection decisions that they would make and recommend us to make. 
Participants were presented with a job ad similar to that used in Study 2, but more elaborate and 
focused on finding a general project manager rather than a financial consultant (Appendix D in 
the online supplement). Participants were randomly assigned to watch one of the four videos, all 
of which had a similar beginning, but varied in the content of the response to a question 
pertaining to motivation (see Appendix). 
The videos were based on a subset of the same scripts pretested in Study 2. We hired a 
male professional actor and video-recorded him, ostensibly during a job interview that took place 
during final stages of a selection process. The video shooting took place in a professional media 
center, and the actor learned the interview scripts pretested and validated in Study 2 and followed 
them during the interview using a hidden teleprompter. This setup ensured a high degree of 
mundane and psychological realism for the decision makers who viewed the videos, while 
maintaining a high degree of standardization and experimental control.  
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Measures. After watching the video, participants responded to the same measures of 
intrinsic ( = .92) and extrinsic motivation ( = .84) used in the piloting of the scripts described 
in Study 2 (four items for each5), and then made selection decisions (binary and continuous).  
STUDY 3A: RESULTS  
Table 5 contains details of Study 3a variables, and Table 6 details of regression analyses. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Expression of extrinsic motivation is negatively related to perceived intrinsic 
motivation (Hypothesis 1).  We regressed perceived intrinsic motivation on expressed intrinsic 
and expressed extrinsic motivation conditions. We also included work experience in the model to 
examine the role of work experience in motivation purity bias. We find that extrinsic motivation 
was negatively related to intrinsic motivation perceptions (b = -0.22, s.e. = 0.11, p = .047; see 
Table 6), providing support for Hypothesis 1. We note that repeating the analysis without 
controlling for the intrinsic motivation condition or any other control, the effect is marginally 
significant (b = -0.21, s.e. = 0.11, p = .056). Results of all subsequent analyses in this study 
without inclusion of controls hold. 
The effect did not differ depending on the level of intrinsic motivation the candidate 
expressed (interaction: b = 0.36, s.e. = 0.22, p = .107). Thus, motivation purity bias affected 
candidates regardless of the level of intrinsic motivation they expressed. Furthermore, the effect 
is specific to extrinsic motivation expressions: Coded levels of intrinsic motivation did not relate 
                                                 
 
5 In this study, as well as Study 3b, we randomly changed the position of the anchors of the scales. Namely, 
sometimes “strongly disagree” would be on the left-hand side and “strongly agree” on the right hand side, and 
sometimes the opposite. We did so to mitigate single-source self-report methods biases (Podsakof, MacKenzie, Lee, 
& Podsakof, 2003).  
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to extrinsic motivation perceptions (b = -0.07, s.e. = 0.10, p = .454), as in Study 1. Finally, and 
somewhat disturbingly, we find that the motivation purity bias was no less pronounced among 
more experienced decision makers (interaction: b = 0.01, s.e. = 0.01, p = .601). 
Implications for selection decisions (Hypothesis 2). We found that perceived intrinsic 
motivation predicted selection likelihood (b = 1.18, s.e. = 0.23, p < .001). Perceived extrinsic 
motivation was not related to selection likelihood (b = 0.32, s.e. = 0.24, p = .176). Perceived 
intrinsic motivation was positively related to higher continuous candidate ratings (b = 7.32, s.e. = 
1.56, p < .001), and so was perceived extrinsic motivation (b = 4.21, s.e. = 1.70, p = .014), 
though the effect of intrinsic was significantly stronger (χ2 = 42.78, p < .001). These results are 
consistent with our arguments that decision makers perceive intrinsic motivation to be more 
important than extrinsic motivation when making selection decisions.  
We next examined the indirect effect of extrinsic motivation condition on hiring 
decisions through perceptions of intrinsic motivation. Extrinsic motivation expression had a 
negative indirect effect via reduced perceptions of intrinsic motivation on both binary selection 
decision (b= -0.26; s.e. = 0.13; CI95%: -0.61, -0.002) as well as the continuous candidate ratings 
(b= -1.61; s.e. = 0.92; CI95%: -3.75, -0.09). The results support Hypothesis 2.    
Supplementary analysis. Beyond our theory tests, we note that, in this study, the 
extrinsic motivation expression factor did not significantly correlate with perceptions of extrinsic 
motivation, and the intrinsic motivation expression factor did not significantly correlate with 
perceptions of intrinsic motivation. We argue that fact that the expressed intrinsic motivation 
factor is not related to intrinsic motivation perceptions is part of the phenomenon we study: 
Since high levels of extrinsic motivation depress perceived intrinsic motivation, it is conceivable 
that on average the two expressed intrinsic motivation conditions result in comparable levels of 
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perceived intrinsic motivation. Similarly, our theoretical background may be useful to explain 
the lack of relationship between the expressed extrinsic motivation factor and extrinsic 
motivation perceptions, as it points to the fact that people primarily pay attention to extrinsic 
expression when making inferences about intrinsic motivation, given the lack of public discourse 
and attention to extrinsic motivation in any other role. This rationale also underlined our decision 
to separate our main studies, in which people report their naturally occurring perceptions, from 
our manipulation checks, in which people instead rated objective levels of expressed intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation. 
STUDY 3A: DISCUSSION 
Study 3a provided further support for our theory using a high-involvement design in 
which hiring managers making decisions on a regular basis were told that their responses were 
consequential for hiring decisions. However, one limitation of Study 3a is that, although we 
conducted extensive pretests for the different scripts used for the study, the wording used to 
manipulate intrinsic manipulation varied for the two extrinsic conditions and vice versa. In Study 
3b, we sought to conduct an additional test of our theory using an even higher level of 
experimental control so as to maximize internal validity. To this end, we used the exact same 
words to manipulate intrinsic motivation in both extrinsic conditions, and the exact same words 
to manipulate extrinsic motivation in both intrinsic conditions. As in Study 1, in this study we 
also measured and controlled for perceived greed, perceived norm deviation and perceived future 
demands. Additionally, we measured perceived candidate risk in terms of openness to outside 
offers to account for the possibility that candidates perceived as higher on extrinsic motivation 
might be seen as riskier in terms of commitment to a particular job.  
STUDY 3B: METHOD 
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Participants and design. As in Study 3a, we pretended to be a small company seeking to 
validate its screening procedure, so managers were made to believe they were making 
consequential decisions. We recruited 247 hiring managers (non-overlapping sample from Study 
3a) through ROI Rocket (23.79% female, mean age = 42.22, s.d. = 11.47, average years of work 
experience = 19.92, s.d. = 12.94). As with Study 3a, in order to qualify for the study, they had to 
be managers with at least three direct reports and making hiring decisions on a regular basis. 71.8 
percent of the managers reported making hiring decisions at least once a month, 22.03% made 
such a decision once in six months and 6.17% once per year. We paid ROI Rocket $11 for each 
completed survey. Managers were randomly assigned to one of the four experiential conditions: 
2 (expressed extrinsic motivation: average vs. high) × 2 (expressed intrinsic motivation: average 
vs. high). 
Procedure and materials. The procedure was identical to that used in Study 3a, except 
that, instead of watching a video, participants read a transcript of the interview (after reading the 
resume of the candidate). As noted above, we kept the exact same wording to signal intrinsic 
motivation in both extrinsic conditions, and the same wording to signal extrinsic motivation in 
both intrinsic conditions (see Appendix for details). Although the wording used in this study was 
a subset of the validated ones from previous studies, to be conservative, we again assessed the 
effectiveness of our manipulation in the same manner as reported in Study 2. The results of this 
validation appear in the online supplement.  
After reading the resume and the transcript (which varied in the last part based on the 
assigned motivation condition), managers rated each candidate on intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation using the same scales used in Study 3a (intrinsic:  = .89; extrinsic:  = .84), and 
made hiring decisions (both binary and using continuous rating). They also completed the same 
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scales of greed ( = .92), norm deviation ( = .69) and perceived future demands ( = .85) as in 
Study 1. For perceived norm deviation, we included only the first two items of the scale, as 
including the third one (which is reverse coded) yielded a reliability score that is not adequate. 
We note that including the third item in the scale and repeating all the analyses has no effect on 
any of the results. We also added a single question asking managers to what extent they thought 
the candidate was likely to accept the job if offered to the candidate so as to measure perceived 
candidate risk, as noted above. 
STUDY 3B: RESULTS  
Table 7 contains details of Study 3b variables, and Table 8 details of regression analyses. 
Higher expressed extrinsic motivation was unrelated to perceived future demands, norm 
deviation, greed, or perceived candidate risk, which suggests that extrinsic motivation expression 
is indeed seen as common and expected, as we argue. Nevertheless, we control for these 
perceptions in our analyses, given their associations with perceived intrinsic motivation as well 
as selection outcomes (see Tables 7 and 8). 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Expression of extrinsic motivation is negatively related to perceived intrinsic 
motivation (Hypothesis 1).  We regressed perceived intrinsic motivation on the two expressed 
motivation conditions, thus controlling for levels of expressed intrinsic motivation when 
estimating impact on perceived intrinsic motivation. We included perceptions of greed, future 
demands, norm deviation, candidate risk, and work experience in the model. We find that 
extrinsic motivation was negatively related to intrinsic motivation perceptions (b = -0.22, s.e. = 
0.11, p = .048; see Table 8), providing support for Hypothesis 1. We note that repeating the 
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analysis without controlling for the intrinsic motivation condition or any other control, the effect 
is similar but only marginally significant (b = -0.20, s.e. = 0.12, p = .091). Results of all 
subsequent analyses in this study remain similar when controls are excluded, with the exception 
of indirect effects, which were only significant at the 90% confidence level.  
We further find that the effect did not differ depending on the level of intrinsic 
motivation the candidate expressed (interaction: b = 0.18, s.e. = 0.22, p = .408). Thus, motivation 
purity bias affected candidates regardless of the level of intrinsic motivation they expressed. 
Furthermore, the effect was specific to extrinsic motivation expressions: Coded levels of intrinsic 
motivation did not relate to extrinsic motivation perceptions (b = -0.04, s.e. = 0.10, p = .638), as 
in Studies 1 and 3a. We again find that the motivation purity bias was no less pronounced among 
more experienced decision makers (interaction: b = -0.01, s.e. = 0.01, p = .125). 
Implications for selection decisions (Hypothesis 2). We found that perceived intrinsic 
motivation predicted selection likelihood (b = 1.60, s.e. = 0.32, p < .001). Perceived extrinsic 
motivation was not related to selection likelihood (b = -0.28, s.e. = 0.32, p = .376). Results for 
the continuous measure of candidate’s ratings exhibited a similar pattern, such that perceived 
intrinsic motivation was positively related to higher ratings (b = 8.01, s.e. = 1.20, p < .001), 
while perceived extrinsic motivation was not (b = -2.02, s.e. = 1.26, p = .112).  
We examined the indirect effect of extrinsic motivation condition on hiring decisions 
through perceptions of intrinsic motivation (controlling for the alternative mediators). Extrinsic 
motivation had a negative indirect effect via reduced perceptions of intrinsic motivation on both 
binary selection decision (b= -0.35; s.e. = 0.22; CI95%: -0.87, -0.006) as well as the continuous 
candidate ratings (b= -1.74; s.e. = 0.89; CI95%: -3.71, -0.25). The results support Hypothesis 2. 
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We note that the extrinsic condition did not significantly correlate with extrinsic perceptions, as 
in Study 3a, arguably due to the same reasons offered in Study 3b discussion.  
INTERNAL META-ANALYSIS 
We followed recent recommendations to conduct a single paper meta-analysis in any 
multiple studies paper (McShane & Böckenholt, 2017). A random effects meta-analysis found 
that the negative effect of extrinsic motivation expression on perceived intrinsic motivation was 
significant (b = -0.24, s.e. = 0.03; CI95%: -0.30, -0.18), providing support for Hypothesis 1. We 
repeated the meta-analysis without controls, and the effect of extrinsic motivation expression on 
perceived intrinsic motivation remained significant (b = -0.25, s.e. = 0.03; CI95%: -0.32, -0.19). 
Indirect effects on binary selection decisions (b = -0.34, s.e. = 0.06; CI95%: -0.46, -0.22) and 
continuous rankings (b = -2.77, s.e. = 0.67; CI95%: -4.08, -1.45) were also significant, providing 
support to Hypothesis 2. 
Interestingly, in Study 2, we found that the negative effect of expressed extrinsic 
motivation on perceptions of intrinsic motivation was stronger at higher levels of expressed 
intrinsic motivation. This effect can also be interpreted the other way around, as the effect of 
expressed intrinsic motivation on perceptions of intrinsic motivation being dampened when 
expressed extrinsic motivation is high, a finding that might suggest that decision makers’ 
inferences are aligned with the original crowding out effect. However, this interaction emerged 
in only one study, and a random effects meta-analysis found it not to be significant across all the 
studies (b = 0.05, s.e. = 0.10; CI95%: -0.14, 0.25). Overall, the results are most consistent with our 
management myth perspective suggesting that expressed extrinsic motivation undermines 
perceived intrinsic motivation, and the effect seems robust regardless of the level of intrinsic 
motivation candidates express.  
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We found in one of the four studies that expressions of intrinsic motivation had an effect 
on perceived extrinsic motivation (Study 2), while in the three other studies expressed extrinsic 
motivation undermined perceived intrinsic motivation but expressed intrinsic motivation had no 
effect on perceived extrinsic motivation. We meta-analyzed the effect of intrinsic motivation 
expression on perceived extrinsic motivation across the studies and found that it was not 
significant (b = -0.06, s.e. = 0.07; CI95%: -0.19, 0.07). These results support our arguments, which 
highlighted that the public discourse was asymmetrical when it comes to discussing downsides 
of extrinsic relative to intrinsic motivation. Finally, we also examined the overall main effect of 
extrinsic motivation expression on selection outcomes, controlling for the indirect effect through 
intrinsic motivation perceptions, and found it to be not significant (binary variable: b = 0.33, s.e. 
= 0.22; CI95%: -0.11, 0.76; for the continuous variable: b = 0.43, s.e. = 0.98; CI95%: -1.49, 2.35). 
GENERAL DISCUSSION  
We theorized that the management myth concerning the effect of extrinsic motivation on 
intrinsic motivation is stronger than management research, leading decision makers to perceive 
candidates who express extrinsic motivation as less intrinsically motivated, an effect we term 
motivation purity bias. The results of four studies provided an overall support to our theorizing 
that decision makers interpret candidates’ expression of satisfaction with extrinsic features of the 
job as indicative of lower intrinsic motivation, and that such perception of lower intrinsic 
motivation in turn leads to bias in selection decisions.  
We documented motivation purity bias in the context of selection decisions for salaried 
employment, the most common and financially relevant type of selection decisions (Gerhart & 
Bretz, 1994), which suggests that the problematic effect might be quite widespread and affecting 
selection outcomes on a wide scale. That the effect arises in this context provides evidence of its 
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biased nature, given the literature showing that indirectly-salient incentives (which correspond to 
those offered in this context) amplify the positive effect of intrinsic motivation on performance 
more than do directly-salient incentives (for example, per-piece rate), in addition to incentives 
having an independent positive effect on performance (Cerasoli et al., 2014). We also 
documented motivation purity bias even though we focused on those forms of extrinsic 
motivation expressions that signal alignment between financial goals in one’s job and other 
personally important long-term personal goals, which past research finds to be strongly 
positively related to intrinsic motivation (Gerhart & Fang, 2015). Our results thus suggest that 
mitigating motivation purity bias is not just in candidates’, but also in organizations’ interest. 
Finally, we found that motivation purity bias affected candidates regardless of the level of 
intrinsic motivation they expressed, a finding that further illustrates both the obstinate and the 
biased nature of the effect.  
Implications for Theory 
Our findings demonstrate the importance of studying naïve beliefs concerning motivation 
and call for more research on the topic. Past motivation research studied motivation primarily 
from the employee perspective. Most studies focused on examining how the different types of 
motivation are related to each other, or their direct and interactive relationships with different 
measures of performance (e.g. Cerasoli et al., 2014). Despite motivation being a core concept in 
the management literature, we know little about how decision makers perceive and understand 
others’ motivation. Research on how decision makers’ biased beliefs impact consequential 
organizational decisions, such as selection decisions, was limited to myths concerning social 
categories, such as those regarding gender and beauty (Hammermesh, 2011; Perry, Davis-Blake, 
& Kulik, 1994). This gap created by the idiosyncratic developments of these different intellectual 
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traditions means that there is a limited understanding of the role of myths concerning motivation, 
as well as other worker characteristics, in consequential organizational decisions. We thus 
contribute to filling this gap through an integration of the motivation and organizational decision 
making biases literature, and in so doing import an important novel perspective to each literature. 
We focus on what is perhaps the most widely discussed myth concerning motivation, the 
antagonistic view of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. Our findings, summarized in the meta-
analysis section above, suggest that management research might have played a role in creating 
motivation purity bias, as evidenced by the fact that we generally did not observe a symmetrical 
effect of intrinsic motivation expression on extrinsic motivation perception (which would 
suggest that the effect of extrinsic motivation expression is due to a more general assumption of 
either-or influence among any two motives). This finding contributes to the literature lamenting 
the gap between management research and practice (Rynes et al., 2001). Most of the focus in this 
research was on the fact that managers fail to turn often enough to the academia to find solutions 
to real-world problems (Abrahamson, 1996; Mowday, 1997; Porter & McKibbon, 1988), and 
academics fail to turn to practitioners to seek help or inspiration in formulating research 
problems (Sackett & Larson, 199). Our findings demonstrate that the science—practice gap may 
be more complex and problematic: Practitioners do seem to adopt ideas from the academia (as 
reflected by the fact that they adopted early theories portraying intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
in a zero-sum fashion), but beliefs will rarely be updated concurrently with scientific 
developments, leading theories to take a life of their own. Thus, in addition to the cross-sectional 
view of science—practice gap, our results suggest that a longitudinal conceptualization is 
warranted, whereby the gap may close and open various times in response to scientific 
developments, but that, due to the evolving nature of science and a limited ability of scientists to 
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reach a wide audience rapidly, the gap may often arise because disproved scientific theories may 
continue to dominate public attention.  
Our findings also contribute to the impression management literature by challenging one 
of the core assumptions in this line of work, which may spark new theoretical developments. We 
document a notable departure from a major assumption in the impression management literature, 
that candidates generally know what image they are supposed to convey when being interviewed 
for a job, and that they try to align their conduct accordingly (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). Our 
pilot study suggested that people see it as normative and benign to express satisfaction with 
extrinsic features of the job. However, our studies show that hiring managers do not receive such 
expressions in a benign manner, suggesting a discrepancy that inhibits job candidate’s efforts to 
manage their impression while interviewing for a job. It may appear puzzling that people 
respond negatively to others’ expression of extrinsic motives, while at the same time do not 
anticipate a similar backlash in response to their own extrinsic motivation expression. It may be 
that from a candidate’s perspective, true positive motives (e.g., expression of satisfaction with 
the benefits offered) are salient, and that candidates’ typically do not bother assuming a decision 
maker’s perspective, leading to a lack of self-censoring. Future research is needed to address this 
possibility.  
Implications for Practice 
Our results suggest that the management myth regarding extrinsic motivation might 
contribute to motivation purity bias beyond a more general human tendency to view different 
types of motivation as mutually exclusive, given that extrinsic motivation expressions more 
strongly undermined perceptions intrinsic motivation than did intrinsic motivation expressions 
undermine perceptions of extrinsic motivation. This result is encouraging. If motivation purity 
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bias was a result of a strong universal psychological bias, attenuating it might be difficult. Since 
it seems to be amplified by the social discourse specific to extrinsic motivation, changing the 
discourse offers the promise of attenuating the bias. 
As with other myths that introduce bias in organizations, such as those regarding gender 
and beauty, managing the problematic effect of management myths regarding extrinsic 
motivation will require a coordinated action among the academia, the public, organizations, and 
candidates themselves. Academia is perhaps most responsible for managerial theories, their 
accuracy, and their impact on the real world, and also has the most power to dispel myths 
regarding extrinsic motivation, the same way it tries to dispel other myths about human behavior. 
The public can also contribute through policy-level solutions, for example by requiring 
companies to provide all possible information regarding extrinsic incentives early on in the 
selection process and keep the discussions concerning motives to a minimum. Organizations can 
contribute by making such adjustments to the selection process or through employee training.  
Unfortunately, the implications of our findings for candidates are that openness might not 
be the best strategy when it comes to discussing extrinsic motivation during the selection 
process. It does not seem like decision makers are leveraging expressions of extrinsic motivation 
as useful information, as indicated by a non-significant average direct effect of extrinsic 
motivation expression for selection outcomes in our studies. Rather, extrinsic motivation 
expression seems to only impact their perception of candidate intrinsic motivation, which 
suggests that not volunteering information that one is highly extrinsically motivated would not 
deprive organizations of useful information, and might help them avoid succumbing to the 
motivation purity bias. 
Limitations and future research  
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The current investigation represents the first test of the phenomenon, and more research 
is needed to test generalizability, robustness, and actionable boundary conditions. We aimed at 
using multiple methods and samples in our research to increase generalizability of and 
confidence in our conclusions, but our research was largely experimental in nature and we were 
not able to gain access to other forms of data. Access to real hiring notes and interviews would 
help shed further light onto motivation purity bias in hiring decisions as well as potentially other 
consequential organizational decision-making situations.  
Motivation purity bias might disproportionally harm workers who have a pressing need 
for certain extrinsic job features, such as money or flexible work schedule. Given this, the bias 
might be the most damaging to those lacking money or time, or those whose life circumstances 
introduce idiosyncratic burdens and challenges. Future studies are needed to test these 
possibilities and thus pinpoint areas in which intervention is most needed. Future research is also 
needed to establish not just whether certain groups are disproportionately likely to (have to) 
express extrinsic motivation, but also whether motivation purity bias is stronger in relation to 
certain types of candidates. For example, one could expect that motivation purity bias would be 
more pronounced in relation to women as they are generally perceived as less committed to work 
(Correll et al., 2007; Fernandez-Mateo & King, 2011; Rivera and Tilcsik, 2016), which might 
make decision makers even more sensitive to cues they interpret as relevant to detecting lower 
intrinsic motivation among women, including expressions of extrinsic motivation. 
Our findings also have implications for future research on naïve views of motivation 
(Heath, 1999; DeVoe & Iyengar, 2004). One striking finding we observe across our studies is 
that people seem to see very few positive sides of extrinsic motivation. Our theory focused on 
the impact expressed extrinsic motivation has on perceived motivation, and we predicted it 
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would overshadow any potential positive reactions to extrinsic motivation. However, we did not 
make specific predictions as to whether people would or would not see some value in extrinsic 
motivation. As we report in the internal meta-analysis part, we find across studies virtually zero 
relationship between expressed extrinsic motivation and selection outcomes. This is puzzling 
given that extrinsic incentives are a strong predictor of performance (Cerasoli et al., 2014). Our 
findings suggest that there might be a disturbingly large gap between people’s beliefs about the 
importance of extrinsic incentives and the reality. If so, this might lead not just to inadequate 
valuation of extrinsic motivation in selection decisions, but more broadly to inefficiency in 
various other domains of organizational life where understanding extrinsic motivation is 
important for effective decision making, such as incentivization decisions. We thus hope that our 
findings provide impetus for future research to investigate broader problems and inefficiencies 
generated by naïve beliefs concerning motivation.  
CONCLUSION  
Four studies found evidence of motivation purity bias, or the fact that decision makers 
interpret job candidates’ expressions of extrinsic motivation as connoting lower intrinsic 
motivation (despite evidence to the contrary), ultimately engendering bias in selection decisions. 
Our research points to what is potentially a systemic source of inefficiency for organizations and 
harm for candidates. We hope that our findings motivate a more balanced thinking about 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and promote more attention to myths concerning motivation in 
management research and practice. 
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS (STUDY 1)a 
  
a N = 256. Correlations higher than |0.05| are significant at p < .05  
b Coded: 0 = “no,” 1 = “yes.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  1. Coded Extrinsic Motivation 3.60 0.52   1.80 4.60           
  2. Coded Intrinsic Motivation 3.38 0.67   1.43 4.90 .07          
  3. Coded Competence 3.03 0.80   1.14 5.00 .08 .71         
  4. Perceived Extrinsic Motivation  3.60 0.88   1.00 5.00 .27 .02 .03        
  5. Perceived Intrinsic Motivation  3.48 1.07   1.00 5.00 -.07 .34 .30 -.09       
  6. Perceived Future Demands 3.22 0.99   1.00 5.00 .01 -.12 -.02 .30 -.30      
  7. Perceived Norm Deviation   2.65 0.79   1.00 5.00 -.06 -.24 -.26 .03 -.48 .23     
  8. Perceived Greed 2.63 0.94   1.00     5.00 .10 -.17 -.10 .30 -.46 .55 .37    
  9. Length of letter (#words) 238.12 101.03 27.00 591.00 .19 .55 .57 .09 .25 -.03 -.17 -.07   
10. Binary Selection Decisions b    0.48 0.50   0.00     1.00 -.01 .27 .33 -.04 .54 -.18 -.46 -.33 .22  
11. Candidate Ratings    61.35   24.92    .00 100.00 .00 .35 .42 -.02 .63 -.16 -.53 -.36 .29 .70 
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TABLE 2: REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS (STUDY 1)a 
 
       
  Model 1: Perceived Intrinsic Motivation Model 2: Binary Selection Decisions  Model 3: Candidate ratings  
 b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. 
Coded Competence       0.07 (0.04)    0.85***     7.28*** (0.98) 
Coded Extrinsic Motivation  -0.18* (0.05)   -0.04 (0.14)  -0.25 (1.07) 
Coded Intrinsic Motivation  0.22*** (0.05)   -0.35* (0.16)  -1.55 (1.12) 
Length of letter (#words)          0.00** (0.00)    0.00 (0.00)   0.01 (0.01) 
Perceived Future Demands      -0.06† (0.04)    0.07 (0.10)   1.72* (0.69) 
Perceived Norm Deviation -0.43*** (0.05)   -1.02*** (0.13)  -7.76*** (0.95) 
Perceived Greed  -0.31*** (0.05)   -0.24* (0.12)  -2.76** (0.81) 
Perceived Intrinsic Motivation      1.17*** (0.12)   9.78*** (0.67) 
Perceived Extrinsic motivation     -0.00 (0.11)   0.85 (0.72) 
Constant 5.09*** (0.28)   -2.50* (0.97) 28.87*** (7.04) 
       
Observations             1,233  1,233  1,233  
R2b           0.39   0.34     0.51   
a Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
b Pseudo R2 is reported for the binary choice dependent variable.        
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, † p<0.1      
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS (STUDY 2)a 
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 Mean s.d. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Intrinsic Condition b   0.50   0.50 0.00     1.00      
2. Extrinsic Condition b   0.50   0.50 0.00     1.00 .00     
3. Perceived Intrinsic Motivation   3.75   1.00 1.00     5.00 .48 -.15    
4. Perceived Extrinsic Motivation   3.94   0.93 1.00     5.00 -.15 .41 -.06   
5. Binary Selection Decisions c   0.59   0.49 0.00     1.00 .43 -.12 .57 -.20  
6. Candidate Ratings 67.09 23.17 0.00 100.00 .41 -.10 .67 -.06 .68 
a N = 302. Correlations higher than |0.05| are significant at the p < .05 b Coded as 0 = “average” and 1 = “high.” c Coded: 0 = “no,” 1 = “yes.” 
 
 
TABLE 4: REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS (STUDY 2) a 
 
Model 1: Perceived Intrinsic 
Motivation 
Model 2: Binary 
Selection Decisions 
Model 3: Candidate 
Ratings 
 Variables  b   s.e. b   s.e. b   s.e. 
Intrinsic Condition   0.96*** (0.05)         0.92*** (0.14)        5.42*** (1.05) 
Extrinsic Condition  -0.29***  (0.04)   0.09 (0.16) -0.47 (0.96) 
Perceived Intrinsic 
Motivation          1.58*** (0.13)       14.26*** (0.67) 
Perceived Extrinsic 
Motivation         -0.72*** (0.12)  -0.04 (0.74) 
Constant 3.42*** (0.04)      -3.10*** (0.54)      11.21** (3.92) 
       
Observations 1,208    1,208   1,208  
R2b 0.25    0.34  0.46  
a Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
b Pseudo R2 is reported for the binary dependent variable. 
*** p < 0.001, ** p< 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 
TABLE 5: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS (STUDY 3a)a 
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 Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Extrinsic conditionb    0.46   0.50 0.00     1.00       
2. Intrinsic conditionb    0.46   0.50 0.00     1.00  .10       
3. Manager's work experience 21.39 11.40 3.00   61.00  .05  .12     
4. Perceived Intrinsic Motivation    4.14   0.86 1.00     5.00 -.12  .08 -.13     
5. Perceived Extrinsic Motivation    4.10   0.78 1.25     5.00 -.02 -.06 -.10 .42    
6. Binary Selection Decisions c    0.77   0.42 0.00     1.00  .06   .05 -.14 .44 .23  
7. Candidate Ratings  75.20 20.06 0.00 100.00  .09   .06   .05 .36 .28 .54 
a N = 239. Correlation above |0.12| are significant at the p  .05  
b Coded as 0 = “average” and 1 = “high”. 
c Coded: 0 = “no”, 1 = “yes”. 
 
TABLE 6: REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS (STUDY 3a) a 
 
  
Model 1: Perceived 
Intrinsic Motivation 
Model 2: Binary Selection 
Decisions 
Model 3: 
 Candidate Ratings 
 b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. 
Intrinsic Conditiona  0.18 (0.11)  0.21 (0.36) 1.01 (2.45) 
Extrinsic Conditiona  -0.22* (0.11)    0.72 † (0.37)   5.22* (2.43) 
Manager's Work Experience  -0.01* (0.00) -0.03 (0.02) 0.17 (0.11) 
Perceived Intrinsic Motivation           1.18*** (0.23)       7.32*** (1.56) 
Perceived Extrinsic Motivation     0.32 (0.24)   4.21* (1.70) 
Constant    4.37*** (0.13)      -4.55*** (1.20)   21.19** (8.12) 
       
Observations 239  239  239  
R2b 0.04    0.20    0.18   
a Coded as 0 = “average” and 1 = “high”. 
b Pseudo R2 is reported for the binary dependent variable.      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1     
 
 
TABLE 7: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS (STUDY 3b)a 
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a N = 247. Correlations above |0.13| are significant at the p < .05 b Coded as 0 = “average” and 1 = “high” c Coded: 0 = “no,” 1 = “yes.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Extrinsic Conditionb   0.47   0.50 0.00     1.00           
2. Intrinsic Conditionb    0.49   0.50 0.00     1.00 -.04          
3. Manager's Work Experience  20.10 12.93 2.00   51.00 .04 -.02         
4. Perceived Extrinsic Motivation    3.99   0.82 1.25     5.00 .03 .00 .06        
5. Perceived Intrinsic Motivation    3.86   0.88 1.00     5.00 -.12 .22 .04 .51       
6. Perceived Candidate Risk    4.04   0.93 1.00     5.00 .13 .02 .26 .38 .24      
7. Perceived Greed    2.52   1.15 1.00     5.00 .07 .00 -.26 .05 -.10 -.06     
8. Perceived Future Demands    3.14   1.02 1.00     5.00 .05 .01 -.21 .12 .03 .15 .55    
9. Perceived Norm Deviation    2.37   0.97 1.00     5.00 .01 -.20 -.03 -.24 -.35 -.42 -.14 -.20   
10. Binary Selection Decisionsc     0.77   0.42 0.00     1.00 .00 .09 -.24 .12 .42 -.02 -.13 -.09 -.18  
11. Candidate Ratings  75.09 15.28 0.00 100.00 -.09 .10 -.10 .17 .49 .17 -.21 -.16 -.32 .61 
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TABLE 8: REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS (STUDY 3b) a 
  
Model 1: Perceived Intrinsic 
Motivation  
Model 2: Binary Selection 
Decisions 
Model 3: Candidate 
Ratings 
 b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. 
             
Intrinsic Conditiona    0.26* (0.11) -0.32 (0.42) -1.58 (1.74) 
Extrinsic Conditiona   -0.22* (0.11)  0.68 (0.42) -0.46 (1.70) 
Manager's Work Experience        -0.00 (0.00)       -0.07*** (0.02)       -0.25*** (0.07) 
Perceived Greed   -0.11† (0.06)  -0.39† (0.23)   -1.74† (0.91) 
Perceived Future Demands  0.03 (0.07) -0.33 (0.26)     -2.84** (1.01) 
Perceived Norm Deviation       -0.25*** (0.06)   -0.42† (0.25)    -3.35** (1.02) 
Perceived Candidate Risk   0.12† (0.07)  -0.28 (0.27) 1.44 (1.12) 
Perceived Intrinsic Motivation            1.60*** (0.32)        8.01*** (1.20) 
Perceived Extrinsic Motivation     -0.28 (0.32) -2.02 (1.26) 
Constant       4.12*** (0.42)   2.10 (1.80)       73.65*** (7.91) 
       
Observations 226  226  224  
R2b 0.19     0.31    0.37   
a Coded as 0 = “average” and 1 = “high”. 
b Pseudo R2 is reported for the binary dependent variable.      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1    
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APPENDIX: JOB INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS USED IN STUDIES 2 AND 36 
Beginning of interview (identical in all conditions for Studies 3a and 3b, slight variation 
for the within subjects design in Study 2):  
 
Interviewer: Hello and nice to see you again, Alex. I am very pleased that you have successfully 
passed the job simulation and previous interviews, and am happy we have another chance for a 
conversation today.   
 
Candidate:  Thank you, it is great to be here again.  
 
Interviewer:  What I would like to ask you now is to tell me one strength of yours and one area in 
which you think you need more development. 
 
Candidate: I am a very hard worker, and am always aiming for the best result and work output I 
can provide. Maybe one area of development would be to acquire more hand-on experience with 
the technical language used in this firm.  
 
Ending of interview (different for each condition):  
 
Average intrinsic, average extrinsic:  
Interviewer:  Can you tell me how motivated are you specifically to work for ABD international 
and about what we offer to employees?  
 
Candidate: I am happy about working at ABD international as I can see myself enjoying doing 
this kind of work. I am also happy about the benefits this job offers. 
  
Average intrinsic, high extrinsic:  
Interviewer:  Can you tell me how motivated are you specifically to work for ABD international 
and about what we offer to our employees? 
 
Candidate: I am very excited about the job, and see how I can enjoy doing all the different 
aspects of it. I am also extremely excited about the benefits this job offers and I can see myself 
enjoying the flexibility and lifestyle this job affords. Given my situation and lookout in life, these 
kinds of benefits, rewards, opportunity and ability for telecommuting etc., fit very well with what 
I was hoping to get in a job.  
 
High intrinsic, average extrinsic:  
Interviewer:  Can you tell me how motivated are you specifically to work for ABD international 
and about what we offer to our employees?  
 
Candidate: I am enthusiastic about this job, since I know I will enjoy it, finding it fun and 
rewarding by itself and satisfying my curiosity and interest. It is exactly the kind of job that 
                                                 
 
6 Videos of interviews lasted on average 1:15 minutes.  
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would be genuinely motivating for me, as I simply enjoy both aspects of budgeting and pricing as 
well as aspects of coordination and interactions with other key members in the firm. I see many 
growth and learning opportunities here. I am also happy with the overall package you offer.  
  
High intrinsic, high extrinsic: 
Interviewer:  Can you tell me how excited are you specifically to work for ABD international and 
about what we offer to our employees? 
 
Candidate: I know I will be enjoying this type of work. I know it will be motivating to do the day-
to-day work, and I can learn a lot and grow within this company. This is the type of role I see as 
rewarding by nature to me, as I am someone who enjoys both the more 'individualized' work of 
pricing, budgeting etc., as well as the more collective, team-work aspect of collaborating and 
coordinating with other project managers, contractors and so forth. I am also super enthusiastic 
about the benefits that come with the job. I know the lifestyle that comes with the job and the 
flexible schedule is a huge plus for me. The opportunity and ability for telecommuting as well as 
the opportunities for bonuses, perks, etc., are things I extremely appreciate in this job.  
 
NOTE: For Study 3b we used the exact same wording for each motivation: “I am 
enthusiastic about this job, since I know I will enjoy it, finding it fun and rewarding by itself and 
satisfying my curiosity and interest. It is exactly the kind of job that would be genuinely 
motivating for me, as I simply enjoy both aspects of budgeting and pricing as well as aspects of 
coordination and interactions with other key members in the firm. I see many growth and 
learning opportunities here.” was used for high intrinsic motivation and was appended with 
either “I am also happy about the benefits this job offer” (average extrinsic) or with “I am also 
super enthusiastic about the benefits that come with the job. I know the lifestyle that comes with 
the job and the flexible schedule is a huge plus for me. The opportunity and ability for 
telecommuting as well as the opportunities for bonuses, perks, etc., are things I extremely 
appreciate in this job.” (high extrinsic). For average intrinsic we used: “I am happy about 
working at ABC International as I can see myself enjoying doing this kind of work” (which was 
again appended with either of the above).  
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